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Abstract: Since 2011, Morocco has been engaged in a series of political, constitutional and institutional 
reforms, including a wider respect for human rights. The debates and changes can be attributed to the un-
precedented organised mass protests in Morocco, which became known as the February 20 Movement. 
Importantly, to note, was the fact that the protestors did not challenge the monarchy, what was challenged was 
the democratization of not only Morocco but solidarity with protestors in other countries that experienced 
corruption, social injustice and a serious lack and respect for the most basic and fundamental human rights in a 
broader constitutional context.    
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The wave of the Arab Spring that originated in Tunisia and Egypt arrived at Morocco in 2011, creating 
a pathway of unprecedented organized mass-protest all over the country. Encouraged by the uprising in the 
MENA (Middle East and North African) region, young Moroccans organized themselves demanding substantive 
democratic change, social justice and anti-corruption mechanism to be put in place. The February 20 movement 
named after the first demonstration held on that date, is a good example of one of the new social movements 
characterised by intense use of technology and their vast membership across the country. This article provides a 
brief overview how protestors challenged the dominant institutions and norms in Morocco through their 
collective struggle and how they created new meanings for those institutions, not only by protesting but also 
using the various social media platforms available to them, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter. 
The February 20 movement originated in the midst of the popular uprisings that spread across Middle 
Eastern North African (MENA region) and Libya during the Arab Spring calling for the removal of their 
respective authoritarian, corrupt and dependent political governments.
1
 There is sufficient evidence that the 
February 20 movement is the Moroccan extension of the Arab spring.
2
 The February 20 movement gained 
momentum especially by the youth of Morocco calling for change and addressing short videos on various social 
media platforms such Facebook and YouTube videos to the Monarchy.
3
  It is an important point to mention that 
February 20 movement, members were mostly unknown. They were mostly born in the 1980-1990‟s and, are 
considered to be among the 60 percent of the Moroccan population who were at the time under forty years of 
age.
4
 Of interest, was the fact that Islamists movements were not the motivators of the protests, this is of 
importance as Morocco is always characterised by so called Orientalists assumptions.
5
 Due to use of the various 
social platforms used by the youth to democratize Moroccan society, these protests acquired a new name in the 
Middle East as the “Twitter revolution”.
6
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The February 20, movement slogans and calls was for the establishing of a democratic Morocco through weekly 
demonstrations, calling for significant reforms of the monarchy.
7
 In getting their message across to all, the 
protestors made use of all available social and media platforms pressing for political reforms and urging the 
people to demonstrate together in the streets to demand change in the form of political and social reform.
8
 
Thousands of young Moroccans joined the protest movements that demonstrated in various Moroccan cities and 
regions on 20 February 2011, raising slogans such as „freedom and democracy now‟, „the people want change‟ 
and „for the sake of dignity‟. Although the 20 February movement was not formally allied to mainstream 
politics, although they were later supported by one of the oldest Moroccan Human Rights Organisation 
(AMDH).
9
 At a later stage during the protests, people of the Berber movement, from different political parties, 





 in Morocco incorporates a large range of trends that differ extensively in their ideological tenets as 
well as the extent of their aspirations and perhaps also geographically.
12
 The Islamists of the Party of Justice and 
Development (PJD) did not support or participate in the February 20 movement, however, the biggest Islamist 
group Justice and Spirituality Group (JSG – Al-Adl wal ihsan) – an Islamist opposition group to the monarchy 
joined at a later stage.
13
 Although, the monarchy maintained a conservative approach to the February 20 
movement, surprisingly, Prince Moulay Hicham El Alaoui, a close relative of King Mohammed VI, pronounced 
support in an interview with France 24.
14
 The protestors demands were numerous. In a press conference on 17 
February 2011, Tahani Madman, a nineteen year old student and active member of the movement announced 
some of the movements initial claims at the headquarters of the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH) 
in Rabat.
15
 These claims became more detailed in a national press release on March 13.
16
 In an official statement 
of the February 20 movement, on its Facebook page posting its founding declaration – a mixture of macro-
political demands and socio-political measures.
17
 The macro-political demands included a democratic 
constitution to reflect „the true will of the people‟ and install a parliamentary monarchy, the dissolution of the 
government and parliament, the formation of an interim transitional government subject to the people‟s will and 
an independent, honest judiciary.
18
 The socio-political measures focused on demanding: the release of all 
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political prisoners and prisoners of opinion; the trial of those responsible for arrests, torture and disappearances; 
fighting against corruption and the trial of those involved in corruption cases; the recognition of Amazigh 
(Berber) as an official language in addition to Arabic; the immediate and comprehensive integration of the 
unemployed into the civil service; the ability of all citizens to access social services and the improvement of its 
cost-effectiveness; the nationalization of public services; increased wages; an end to the high cost of living; and 
the guarantee of dignified lives for the people.
19
  
Inasmuch as the effectiveness of the February 20 movement was distinguished by its popular and 
youthful momentum during the early stage of the uprisings, the size of its membership differed from one region 
and one city to another. This happened to the extent that for a few weeks the movement experienced a 
noticeable decline in its level of mobilization and the size of its membership. However, that may have been 
attributable to the structural limitations in the formation of the February 20 movement itself as well as political 
factors linked to initiatives by the state.
20
 For example, one of the key activists linked to the February 20 
movement in Rabat explained that there were groups trying to obstruct the protest: ”authorities paid poor people 
to provoke the protestors into a demonstration”.
21
 It is also reported from May 2011 onwards, the police resorted 
to using violent tactics as well as hiring “counter-demonstrators” in an effort to provoke peaceful 
demonstrations into violent demonstrations.
22
 
According to al-Akhssassi, there were structural limitations marked from the outset by three 
organizational features that had the greatest effect on its socio-political network.
23
 First, it was a movement of 
radical origins. Hence, its formation depended on radical intellectual and political currents which drew from the 
culture of the „revolutionary‟ Moroccan radical left. The movement attempted to absorb new generations of the 
youth and women into this way of intellectual and political radicalism. However, it was this political delineation 
that contributed to creating an intellectual, political and behavioural gap between the 20 February movement 
and the bloc of nationalist political forces who possessed political experience and deep roots in society. This 
delineation in turn was applied to the actual „break‟ that distinguished the 20 February movement‟s attitude and 
approach to the struggle from that of nationalist political society which was marked by traditionalism and 
defeatism. This is perhaps what inspired the self-criticism of the movement by some of its activists. In 
answering the first question, posed by al-Akhssassi, the February 20 movement was driven by young people and 
political inexperience that has been attributed to them caused high expectations for the regeneration of 




 Al-Akhssassi next point is that the 20 February movement was distinguished as being simultaneously a 
formative and a pioneering movement. Its membership included two radical political components that were 
opposed in their intellectual and political aims, namely the radical Marxists, represented by the radical left 
current, and the radical Islamists, represented by the JSA.
25
 Although, this is correct, one must bear in mind that 
they only joined the movement at a later stage. The result is that it created a hybrid „radical‟ formation had a 
negative effect on the level of popular membership in the movement, according to the assessment of its 
activists.
26
 However, in a country such as Morocco, where Islam is the dominant faith, there is bound to be 
heated debates, and perhaps losing sight of how and what the February 20 movement was about and why it 
started with the youth and not any political alignment. Further discrepancies found in Moroccan society are 
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between those who support, albeit reluctantly, reforms backed by the monarchy and those who advocate a 
process of change that refutes the influence of the monarchy.
27
 Moreover, the tactics adopted by the JSA for 
membership into the movement provoked doubts and anxieties in the ranks of the leftist groups.
28
 According to 
Fathallah Arslane, a spokesman for the JSA, allegations that the group was preparing to seize power through an 
armed uprising and replace the monarchy with a radical Islamic fundamentalist government stem from 
fabricated reports in the local pro-state media. In response to increasing pressure by the authorities and press 
reports linking the group to radicalism, the JSA organized what they describe as an extensive “Open Doors” 
campaign in an effort to reach out to Moroccans in order to refute allegations by the group‟s critics linking them 
to radicalism and terrorism. Arslane believes that the popularity of the “Open Doors” program worried the 
authorities, especially ahead of next year‟s parliamentary elections, prompting them to clamp down.
29
 
  Al-Akhssassi last point, the movement was distinguished by its ambiguous orientation.
30
 On the one 
hand, the movement fell into the centre of a „dual attraction‟ between the general and the particular framework. 
The former was the Arab Spring, the events of which had shaken the pillars of autocracy and the pockets of 
corruption in the Mena region and perhaps elsewhere in the Arab world. The latter was represented by the youth 
protest and demand movements, which were governed by the conditions of the national situation.
31
 This dual 
attraction affected the two different contexts of the movement with regard to the trajectory of their struggle and 
their political development. This is indeed the dimensions the February 20 movement ended up with. However, 
one must note, that this not a unique situation. Almost all protest globally will have some resemble to the above.  
II. CONCLUSION 
Historically, Morocco experienced large-scale political repression during the 1970s through the early 
1990s. Through its actions, the regime repressed any claims aimed at challenging its authoritarian sphere of the 
public domain. The emergence of the February 20 movement had the effect of highlighting those issues for 
debate and reform. Prompted by the emergence and fortitude of the February 20 movement, the King of 
Morocco delivered a speech in March 2011 addressing reforms and modernization, resulting in expediting the 
drafting and adoption of a new Moroccan constitution in June 2011. This approach to change can be viewed as 
bottom-up approach compared to the top-down approach, which was adopted in Tunisia and Morocco in the 
past. Although, the February 20 movement had attracted the monarchy as well as the international audiences, 
they must be congratulated. However, there are some serious concerns which must be addressed, for example a 
more independent judiciary and the spreading of information to the rural outskirts of Morocco. 
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